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Abstract
The paper investigates whether liquidity constraints aﬀect ﬁrm size and growth dy-
namics using a large longitudinal sample of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. We run
standard panel-data Gibrat regressions, suitably expanded to take into account liq-
uidity constraints (proxied by cash ﬂow scaled by ﬁrm sales). Moreover, we char-
acterize the statistical properties of ﬁr m ss i z e ,g r o w t h ,a g e ,a n d( s c a l e d )c a s hﬂow
distributions. Pooled data show that: (i) liquidity constraints engender a negative,
statistically signiﬁcant, eﬀect on growth once one controls for size; (ii) smaller ﬁrms
grow more (and experience more volatile growth patterns) after controlling for liquid-
ity constraints; (iii) the stronger liquidity constraints, the more size negatively aﬀects
ﬁrm growth. We ﬁnd that pooled size distributions depart from log-normality and
growth rates are well approximated by fat-tailed, tent-shaped (Laplace) densities.
We also study the evolution of growth-size distributions over time. Our exercises
suggest that the strong negative impact of liquidity constraints on ﬁrm growth which
was present in the pooled sample becomes ambiguous when one disaggregates across
years. Finally, ﬁrms who were young and strongly liquidity-constrained at the be-
ginning of the sample period grew persistently more than those who were old and
weakly liquidity-constrained.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates whether liquidity constraints faced by business ﬁrms aﬀect the
dynamics of ﬁrm size and growth. Since the seminal work of Gibrat (1931), the “Law of
Proportionate Eﬀects” (LPE) has become the empirical benchmark for the study of the
evolution of ﬁrm size over time. In one of its most widely accepted interpretations, the
LPE states that the growth rate of any ﬁrm is independent of its size at the beginning
of the period examined1. In turn, the underlying “random walk” description of ﬁrm (logs
of) size dynamics entailed by the LPE implies, under quite general assumptions, a skewed
lognormal limit distribution for ﬁrm size2.
In the last decades, a rather large body of empirical literature has been trying to test the
LPE “null hypothesis” and its further implications upon industrial organization3.Y e t ,t h e
evidence provided by these contributions is rather mixed, if not contradicting. For example,
panel data analyses suggest that LPE should only hold for large manufacturing ﬁrms.
Moreover, there seem to be many indications supporting the idea that, when only surviving
ﬁrms are considered, average growth rates — as well as their variance — are decreasing with
both size and age. However, despite their statistically signiﬁcance, estimated growth-size
correlations appear to be rather weak, especially once sample selection biases are taken
into account.
More recently, the robustness of the existing evidence in favor of (or rejecting) a LPE-
type of dynamics has been questioned by (at least) two streams of research4.F i r s t , a s
noticed in Bottazzi and Secchi (2004), investigations of ﬁrm growth and size dynamics are
typically carried out using aggregated data (over diﬀerent sectors). This might lead to
the emergence of statistical regularities — as the LPE — which could only be the result of
aggregation of persistently heterogeneous ﬁrm dynamics.
Second, and more important to our discussion here, the traditional approach has
stressed the investigation of growth-size relationships without extensively addressing a de-
1The LPE, also known as Gibrat’s Law (GL), can be stated in terms of expected values as well. As
Sutton (1997) puts it: the “expected value of the increment ﬁrm’s size in each period is proportional to
the current size of the ﬁrm”. See also Mansﬁeld (1962).
2Notice that the LPE might also form the core of a simple, stochastic, model of ﬁrm dynamics. See
e.g. Simon and Bonini (1958), Ijiri and Simon (1977) and Geroski (2000). For a more general discussion
cf. Steindl (1965), Sutton (1997, 1998), Cabral (1995), and Mitzenmacher (2002).
3An exhaustive survey of the LPE literature is of course beyond the scope of this paper. The interested
reader may refer to Geroski (2000) and Lotti, Santarelli, and Vivarelli (2003) (and references therein) for
quite complete overviews.
4The LPE can be violated not only because a statistically signiﬁcant correlation between average growth
and size is present, but also because: (i) higher moments of the growth rates distribution (e.g. variance)
show some size-dependence (Bottazzi, Ceﬁs, and Dosi, 2002); (ii) the (limit) size distribution departs from
log-normality (Bottazzi, Dosi, Lippi, Pammolli, and Riccaboni, 2001); (iii) growth rate distributions are
not normally distributed (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003).
2tailed analysis of other determinants of ﬁrm growth (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002). More
speciﬁcally, the majority of contributions has focused on panel data regressions including
as explanatory variables only size- and age-related measures, as well as non-linear eﬀects,
time and industry dummies, etc. . Very little attention has been paid to other determinants
of ﬁrm growth and size dynamics, such as ﬁnancial factors.
In the last years, however, a growing number of contributions has provided robust
empirical evidence showing that ﬁnancial factors (e.g. liquidity constraints, availability of
external ﬁnance, access to foreign markets, etc.) can have a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrms
investment decisions5. For example, liquidity constraints — measured by scaled measures of
cash ﬂow — have been shown to negatively aﬀect ﬁrm’s investment (Bond, Elston, Mairesse,
and Mulkay, 2003) and to increase the likelihood of failure (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
Harvey, 1994). Moreover, small and young ﬁrms seem to invest more, but their investment
is highly sensible to liquidity constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988a; Gilchrist
and Himmelberg, 1995).
If ﬁnancial factors signiﬁcantly impact on ﬁrms’ investment decisions, then they are
likely to aﬀect ﬁrm size and growth dynamics as well. For instance, highly liquidity-
constrained ﬁrms might face diﬃculties in ﬁnancing their investments and thus suﬀer from
lower growth rates in the future (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988a; Devereaux and
Schiantarelli, 1989). At the same time, size and age may aﬀect the ability of the ﬁrm to
weaken its liquidity constraints and to gain access to external ﬁnancing6. Notice that while
the causal relationship going from liquidity constraints to size — through investment and
growth — should typically occur at a higher frequency, one expects size and age to aﬀect
liquidity constraints over a longer time-scale. Larger and older ﬁrms might indeed face
diﬃculties in ﬁnancing their investment with internal sources — e.g. because of low cash
ﬂow — but, at the same time, easily access to external ﬁnancing because e.g. they belong
to well-established socio-economic networks built over the years.
In this paper, we explore whether the emergence of any LPE-type of dynamics — or
violations thereof — might be inﬂuenced by taking directly into account ﬁnancial factors
(i.e. liquidity constraints) in studying the patterns of ﬁrm size and growth. Following
Elston (2002), we argue that controlling for liquidity constraints may help in discriminating
between “ﬁnancial-related” and “sheer” size-eﬀects. While the ﬁrst type of size-eﬀect
should account for higher growth rates due to better access to external capital and/or
5Space constraints prevent us to discuss here this rather large literature. See, among others, Fazzari and
Athey (1987); Hoshi, Kayshap, and Scharfstein (1991); Hall (1992); Bond and Meghir (1994); Schiantarelli
(1996); Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1996); Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Hu and Schiantarelli (1997);
Hubbard (1998); Mairesse, Hall, and Mulkay (1999).
6Harhoﬀ, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) ﬁnd that limited-liability ﬁrms experience signiﬁcantly higher
growth than unlimited-liability ones. Moreover, Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) provide evidence in favor of
a negative correlation between leverage and future ﬁrms’ growth.
3higher cash ﬂow, the latter might explain higher growth rates in terms of economies of
scale and scope only. Since existing contributions investigating the LPE did not introduce
any controls for ﬁnancial constraints7, their estimates of the impact of ﬁrm size on future
ﬁrm growth might have been the result of a composition of “sheer” and “ﬁnancial-related”
eﬀects.
We employ a database containing observations on 14277 (surviving) Italian manufactur-
ing ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes from 1995 to 2000. The sample was originated from the AIDA
database, covering 90% of all Italian ﬁrms with sales larger than 1M Euros. We ﬁrstly
perform standard (pooled) Gibrat’s type regressions to assess the impact of liquidity con-
straints on employees growth rates. We employ cash ﬂow scaled by ﬁrm sales (SCF)a sa
proxy of liquidity constraints and we control for size and age, as well as their lagged values
and ﬁxed time and sectoral eﬀects8. We show that liquidity constraints engender a nega-
tive, statistically signiﬁcant, eﬀect on growth once one controls for sheer size. Moreover,
smaller ﬁrms grow more, even after controlling for liquidity constraints.
However, both the goodness-of-ﬁt and the magnitude of estimated coeﬃcients appear
to be very weak9. Therefore, as suggested in Bottazzi, Ceﬁs, and Dosi (2002), we move
towards a more detailed exploration of the statistical properties of the joint distribution of
ﬁrms size and growth, conditioned on SCF and age.
First, we explore the properties of the joint, pooled, distribution of size, growth, and
SCF.W e ﬁnd that size distributions depart from log-normality, while growth rates are
well approximated by fat-tailed, tent-shaped (Laplace) densities. Moreover, ﬁrms facing
stronger liquidity constraints grow less and experience more volatile growth patterns. The
stronger liquidity constraints, the larger the absolute value of the observed size-growth
correlation. Growth rate distributions seem however to be quite robust to SCF, once one
controls for mean-variance time-shifts in their distributions.
Second, we investigate the evolution over time of the distributions of size and growth,
conditioning on liquidity constraints and/or age. Our exercises suggest that the absolute
value of the size-growth correlation has substantially decreased through time for any level
of SCF. In addition, liquidity constraints do not seem to engender a strongly negative
impact on ﬁrm growth in any given year. Thus, the negative impact of liquidity constraints
on ﬁrm growth, which was quite strong in our pooled sample, becomes ambiguous when
one disaggregates over time.
7With the exceptions of Becchetti and Trovato (2002) and Elston (2002). Cf. also Carpenter and
Petersen (2002).
8See Section 2 for a discussion of econometric and data-related issues involved in the exercises presented
in the paper.
9Signiﬁcant but very small growth-size correlations are typically the case in the majority of empirical
studies which ﬁnd a violation of the LPE, cf. Lotti, Santarelli, and Vivarelli (2003).
4We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms who were young and strongly liquidity-constrained at the begin-
ning of the sample period experienced in the following years higher average growth rates
than those who were old and weakly liquidity-constrained. Furthermore, we show that
SCF, size, and growth rates are more variable among younger ﬁrms than among older
ones. Therefore, one is able to detect a shift to the right in size distributions for young
and strongly liquidity-constrained ﬁrms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the dataset that we employ
in our empirical analyses and we discuss some important measurement and data-related
issues. Section 3 presents the results of standard regression analyses. The properties of
(pooled) distributions are explored in Section 4. In Section 5 we study the evolution over
time of size and growth distributions, while the eﬀects of age and size on ﬁrm growth
dynamics is brieﬂy examined in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2D a t a
Our empirical analysis is based on ﬁrm-level observations from the AIDA database, de-
v e l o p e db yI t a l i a nC h a m b e r so fC o m m e r c ea n df u r t h e re l a b o r a t e db yB u r e a uV a nD i j k 10.
The database contains longitudinal data from 1992 to 2000 about size, age, and ﬁnancial
variables obtained by the balance sheets of 90% of all Italian ﬁrms (i.e. “lines of business”)
whose sales have exceeded 1M Euros for at least one year in the observed period11.W e
begin by studying ﬁrms belonging to the manufacturing sector as a whole12.
In order to keep statistical consistency, we analyze data for the period 1995-2000. Fur-
thermore, we focus on unconsolidated budgets so as to avoid as much as possible eﬀects on
growth and size due to mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, if one instead considers consoli-
dated budgets, mergers and acquisitions of lines of business belonging to any parent ﬁrm
may show up in the consolidated budget of the parent ﬁrm13.
Our balanced sample consists of N = 14277 observations (per year). We use annual
data on employees (EMP)a so u rm a i np r o x yf o rﬁrm size. Alternative measures of ﬁrm
size such as sales (SAL) and value-added (VA ) — computed as after tax net operating
proﬁts minus total cost of capital — are also considered in order to check the robustness of
our results.
10See http://www.bvdep.it/aida.htm for additional details.
11A company enters the database the year its sales exceed 1M Euros. Data for previous years are then
recovered. Notice that no lower bounds for employees are in principle present.
12According to the ATECO 2 classiﬁcation, we study all ﬁrms whose principal activity ranges from code
15 to code 37. For the manufacturing sector, the ATECO 2 classiﬁcation matches the ISIC one with some
minor exceptions.
13An alternative strategy allowing to wash-away mergers and acquisitions eﬀects is to build “super-
ﬁrms” (Bottazzi, Dosi, Lippi, Pammolli, and Riccaboni, 2001; Bottazzi, Ceﬁs, and Dosi, 2002).
5In line with existing literature, we employ cash ﬂow, scaled by some measure of ﬁrm
size, as our proxy for ﬁrms’ liquidity constraints. More formally, we deﬁne the scaled cash
ﬂow variable (or “cash ﬂow ratio”):
SCFi,t =
CFi,t
SALi,t
, (1)
where i =1 , ..., N are ﬁrms’ labels, t =1 9 9 6 ,...,2000 and CFi,t is calculated as net ﬁrm
revenues plus total depreciation (credits depreciation included)14. We also employ ﬁrm
age (AGE) at the beginning of 1995 (the year of ﬁrm’s birth is directly available in the
database). Growth rates for each size variable X = EMP, SAL, VAare computed as:
X_GRi,t = ∆log(Xi,t)=l o g ( Xi,t) − log(Xi,t−1). (2)
As explained above, our goal is to study the extent to which liquidity constraints might
aﬀect ﬁrm size-growth dynamics. To do so, we focus on single equation models, as well as on
statistical properties of joint distributions. Thus, we do not address here the investigation
of structural models of ﬁrms’ investment behavior and growth. Nonetheless, several data-
related issues require a more detailed discussion.
First,c a s hﬂow ratios are used as a proxy of liquidity constraints. The rationale is
that a low cash ﬂow ratio (i.e. a small SCF) may imply, especially for small ﬁrms, strong
liquidity constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988b). In fact, ﬁrms holding a large
cash ﬂow ratio are likely to ﬁnance internally their investments. Furthermore, in presence
of imperfect capital markets, a high cash ﬂow ratio might also function as a “screening
device” to gain a better access to external ﬁnancing. In presence of credit rationing, larger
cash ﬂow ratios might then be used to get additional external funding, especially when
ﬁrms have some convenience to “go external” for tax reasons15. Indeed, high cash ﬂow
ﬁrms can always choose the right mix between internal and external ﬁnancing if they have
this option (i.e. if the “signalling” eﬀect is present)16.
Second, as noticed by Becchetti and Trovato (2002) and Elston (2002), cash ﬂow can be
14Cf. e.g. Audretsch and Elston (2002), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1996). All subsequent results do not dramatically change if alternative speciﬁcations for the
cash-ﬂo wr a t i o—e . g . log(CF)/log(SAL) or log(CF/SAL) —a r et a k e ni n t oa c c o u n t . W ea l s or e p e a t e d
all subsequent regression exercises and distribution analyses employing alternative scaling variables (e.g.
total assets, capital stock, etc.), but we did not observe any remarkable departure from our basic ﬁndings.
15See however Galeotti, Schiantarelli, and Jaramillo (1994), Goyal, Lehn, and Racic (2002) and Albu-
querque and Hopenhayn (2004) for alternative approaches employing debt-related variables as measures
of liquidity constraints. See also Section 7.
16Furthermore, cash ﬂow is a relatively “fast” variable which can better account for the short-term
impact of liquidity constraints on investments and growth. Since we expect the feedback from size-age
to liquidity constraints to be slower (especially for smaller, young, ﬁrms) and we only have data about 6
years, scaled cash ﬂow seems to have an additional justiﬁcation from a “dynamic” perspective.
6highly correlated with other size measures such as sales or value-added. To minimize the
consequences of this problem, we scale CF with SALand we always use employees (EMP)
as our size measure whenever liquidity constraints enter the picture. In addition, we check
the robustness of all exercises involving size-related measures only by using alternative size
measures such as sales (SAL) and value-added (VA ).
Third, we only observe “surviving” ﬁrms in our sample. This can generate a survival
bias, as high-growth (small) ﬁrms may be over-represented in our data (Lotti, Santarelli,
and Vivarelli, 2003). Unfortunately, we do not have any direct empirical evidence which
might allow us to distinguish between missing values and entry-exit events. Hence, we
performed a preliminary descriptive analysis on size-growth distributions of ﬁrms that were
excluded from our database because some missing values did appear in their records. We
did not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant distribution diﬀerence between “included” ﬁrms
and “excluded” ones. Therefore, we argue that survival biases should not dramatically
aﬀect the results that follow.
Fourth, it must be noticed that ﬁrms in our database are deﬁn e di nt e r m so f“ l i n e s
of business”. This type of unit of analysis allows us to appreciate the eﬀects of liquidity
constraints on growth in a consistent way (given that we choose to focus on unconsolidated
budgets so as to avoid mergers and acquisitions eﬀects). In fact, if one had plant-level
data, cash ﬂow ratios would have not been the right measure for liquidity constraints, as
each plant has typically access to credit in proportion to cash ﬂow ratios of the parent ﬁrm.
Moreover, decisions aﬀecting growth are not undertaken at the plant level, but more likely
at the parent-ﬁrm level.
Fifth, ﬁrms in our database can possibly belong to groups consisting of a “controller”
and many “controlled” ﬁrms. In all these cases (3.4% of all observations), the cash ﬂow
ratio of a controlled ﬁrm might not be a good proxy for its actual liquidity constraints.
In order to avoid this problem, we considered information about parental aﬃliation. More
speciﬁcally, we deﬁned the dummy variable Dsubs (to be employed in our regressions) which
is equal to one if the share of a ﬁrm’s ownership held by shareholders is greater than 50%
at the end of each year. On the contrary, as far as distribution analyses are concerned,
we simply dropped such observations from our sample (this procedure did not change our
results in any substantial way).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for ﬁrm size (EMP, VA , SAL)a n dt h e i rg r o w t h
rates (EMP_GR, VA _GR, SAL_GR), liquidity constraints (SCF)a n da g e( AGE). All
size distributions (as well as scaled cash ﬂow) are extremely skewed to the right as expected,
while growth rates appear to be almost symmetric and quite concentrated around their
average values.
Correlation matrices for all key variables are reported in Tables 2 and 3. As expected,
7CF is highly (positively) correlated with VAboth simultaneously and at one-year lags,
while smaller but still relevant correlations emerge with SAL and, in particular, with
EMP. On the contrary, CF/SAL is weakly correlated with all size measures. This seems
to be an additional justiﬁcation for employing SCF as our proxy for liquidity constraints
and EMP as size-measure in our exercises.
Both average values and coeﬃcients of variation present weak time-trends, suggesting
some non-stationarity of size and SCF distributions. However, once one deﬁnes size and
SCF variables in terms of their ‘normalized’ values with respect to year-averages:
e Xi,t =
Xi,t
N−1 PN
j=1 Xj,t
, (3)
all distributions become stationary over time. Indeed, as Fig. 1 shows for the log of
standardized EMP variable (^ EMP), all ﬁrst moments exhibit almost no variation over
time.
Similar results hold for all other size measures and for SCF. Thus, all our pooled distri-
bution analyses will be performed in terms of e Xi,t variables17. As far as regression analyses
are concerned, we will begin by employing non-standardized values and we will introduce
year dummies to control for non stationarities. We will also check the robustness of our
results by using pooled distributions of standardized values e Xi,t. In this case, growth rates
are accordingly computed as e X_GRi,t = ∆log( e Xi,t). Summary statistics and correlation
structure for pooled, standardized, distributions are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
3 Evidence from Panel-Data Regressions
In this section we present the results of regression analyses conducted on our pooled samples
of observations. We begin by a standard LPE estimation exercise where ﬁrm growth is
regressed against logs of ﬁrm size at the beginning of the period, ﬁrm age at the beginning
of the sample period, as well as non-linear size-age eﬀects (e.g. size and age squared) and
lagged values of both ﬁrm growth and size (Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987). We then introduce
ﬁnancial constraints by adding scaled cash ﬂow (SCFi,t) to the regression (and lagged
values thereof).
We employ non-standardized, pooled, values while controlling for time ﬁxed eﬀects
(Dtime). We also control for industry eﬀects (Dind), deﬁned according to 14 Ateco macro-
classes, and for a “subsidiary” dummy (Dsubs) accounting for companies who are controlled
by more than 50%. This allows us to check whether aﬃliation to a large corporate relaxes
17For a more detailed discussion on this standardization procedure, see Kalecki (1945), Hart and Prais
(1956), and Bottazzi, Dosi, Lippi, Pammolli, and Riccaboni (2001).
8ﬁnancial constraints.
Lagged values of both size and growth (as well as SCFi,t−k, k>2, and interactive
terms such as AGE ∗ EMP) never appear to be signiﬁcant in our regressions. We then
start from the “saturated” model:
EMP_GRi,t = α1 log(EMPi,t−1)+α2SCFi,t−1 + α3 log(AGEi)+
+α4 log
2(EMPi,t−1)+α5 log
2(AGEi)+α6SCFi,t−2 + (4)
+α7Dtime + α8Dind + α9Dsubs + εi,t,
where εi,t is a white-noise term.
W er e l yo nL i k e l i h oo dR a t i oT e s t s( L R T s )t od r o pi ne a c hs t e po n e( o rm o r e )c o v a r i a t e ( s )
and eventually get to our preferred model. As shown in Table 6, this selection procedure
allows us to discard both log
2(AGEi) and log(AGEi) at 5% signiﬁcance level. We also
employ an alternative model selection procedure based on maximization of (pseudo) R2s
(see Table 7).
We begin by standard growth-size regressions and we compare models obtained by
adding covariates. Among all possible speciﬁcations, we show results of regressions that
reach the highest R2 values (which is always very low due to the large number of ob-
servations). This combined procedure suggests that, by omitting log(CFi,t−2) from the
“saturated” model, one gets the highest R2 levels. However, if one also drops log
2(AGEi)
and log(AGEi) — as suggested by LRTs — the goodness of ﬁtd o e sn o td e c r e a s ev e r ym u c h .
Therefore, the two criteria taken together indicate the following “preferred” model:
EMP_GRi,t = β1 log(EMPi,t−1)+β2SCFi,t−1 + β3 log
2(EMPi,t−1) (5)
+β4Dtime + β5Dind + β6Dsubs + εi,t.
Estimation of (5) shows that size eﬀects are signiﬁcant and negative (Lotti, Santarelli,
and Vivarelli, 2003). Our data therefore conﬁrm a rejection of the LPE: smaller ﬁrms grow
m o r e ,e v e nw h e no n ec o n t r o l sf o rﬁnancial constraints18. In addition, ﬁrms with higher
cash ﬂow ratios enjoy higher growth rates, once one controls for sheer size. Notice that
a positive and signiﬁcant non-linear size eﬀect is present. Introducing log
2(EMPi,t−1) in
the regression also implies a higher magnitude for the growth-size correlation. Finally, the
“subsidiary” dummy (as well as all other dummies) is signiﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations,
suggesting that, given the same degree of liquidity constraints, ﬁrms who belong to a large
18Our results also suggest that younger ﬁrms grow more, as shown by a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of
log(AGEi) in Table 7. Anyway, this eﬀect does not seem to be pivotal in our model, as indicated by the
LR test procedure.
9company grow more than those who are “isolated”, possibly because of an easier access to
external ﬁnancing.
The foregoing results seem to be robust vis-à-vis an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent checks. First,
although lagged values of SCF should be in principle important to explain current growth,
our data suggest that SCFi,t−k, k ≥ 2,i sh a r d l ys i g n i ﬁcant in the saturated model (see also
last column in Table 7) and that any statistical signiﬁcance is only due to the large number
of observations we have in our dataset19. Second, if we only consider “ﬁnancial-related”
size eﬀects and we exclude sheer size eﬀects — i.e. if we discard log(EMPi,t−1) —i no u r
regressions, scaled cash ﬂow remains signiﬁcant and negative. This seems to be a strong
indication in favor of the robustness of this measure as a proxy for ﬁrm ﬁnancial constraints.
Third,b o t hs i g n i ﬁcance levels and signs of estimates do not change if one considers year-
standardized variables and omits ﬁxed time eﬀects in the regressions. Fourth,i fo n ea l s o
controls for EMP_GRi,t−1 in the preferred model, all estimates remain signiﬁcant and
their signs do not change. The lagged growth term appears to be signiﬁcant but in general
its magnitude turns out to be quite small. Fifth, although ﬁrms heterogeneity was taken
into account only through industry-speciﬁce ﬀects, our main results do not change if one
estimates a ﬁrst-diﬀerence version of our preferred model (without industry dummies) to
eliminate ﬁrms ﬁxed eﬀects. Indeed, due to the low time-series variability in our sample,
random eﬀects turn out to be almost irrelevant.
Our ﬁndings are in line with previous ones obtained by Becchetti and Trovato (2002),
who show that small surviving Italian ﬁrms experience higher growth rates, but the latter
are negatively aﬀected by the availability of external ﬁnance. Carpenter and Petersen
(2002) reach similar conclusions as far as small ﬁrms in the U.S. are concerned. On the
contrary, Audretsch and Elston (2002) show that medium sized German ﬁrms are more
liquidity constrained (in their investment behavior) than either the smallest or the largest
ones20.
Regression results seem to support the idea that ﬁrm growth is negatively aﬀected by
both size and liquidity constraints. However, the goodness-of-ﬁt of our preferred model is
not very encouraging. In presence of such low R2s (and quite small estimated coeﬃcients),
one might also be tempted to conclude that, albeit signiﬁcant, the eﬀect of size and scaled
CF on average growth rates is irrelevant (at least as policy issues are concerned)21.I n
order to further explore whether our data really exhibit departures from the LPE, we turn
19Although we decided to drop lagged SCF values here, an in-depth investigation of their eﬀects — as
well as of those of cumulated SCF values — is certainly one of the main points in our agenda.
20Elston (2002) ﬁnds that cash ﬂow (not scaled) — after controlling for size and age — positively aﬀects
growth of German Neuer-Markt ﬁrms. We ﬁnd similar results in our sample, too. However, this outcome
may be biased by the high and positive correlation between size (employees) and cash ﬂow. See also Section
7.
21For a discussion on the interpretation of LPE empirical results see Sutton (1997) and Geroski (2000).
10now to a more detailed statistical analysis of pooled size and growth distributions. We shall
investigate in particular the properties of the joint growth-size distribution conditional on
scaled cash ﬂow observations.
4 Statistical Properties of Pooled Size and Growth
Distributions
If the benchmark model of stochastic ﬁrm growth underlying the LPE holds true, then for
any measure of ﬁrms size St, the dynamics of St reads:
St = St−1Rt, (6)
where Rt is a random variable. If rt =l o g Rt are i.i.d. random variables with ﬁnite
mean and variance, then St is well approximated, for suﬃciently large t,b yal o g - n o r m a l
distribution. Moreover, growth rates gt = ∆log(St) should be normally-distributed.
We then begin by checking whether our pooled (year-standardized) ﬁrm size distribu-
tions depart from log-normal ones. As size-rank plots suggest, the distributions of ^ EMP,
] SAL,a n dg VAcan hardly be approximated by a log-normal (cf. Fig. 2 for the evidence
about employees), as the mass of these distributions seems to be shifted to the left. As
Fig. 2 shows, a similar ﬁnding holds for ] SCF as well22.
Furthermore, pooled standardized growth rates appear to follow a tent-shaped distribu-
tion, with tails fatter than those of a Gaussian one (cf. Fig. 3). Growth rate distributions
are indeed well described by a Laplace (symmetric exponential) functional form:
h(x;a,b)=
1
2a
e
−
|x−b|
a , (7)
where a>0. Tent-shaped distributions have been recently found to robustly characterize
growth rates both at an aggregated level (Stanley et al., 1996; Amaral et al., 1997) and
across diﬀerent industrial sectors and countries (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003, 2004).
The foregoing two pieces of evidence (i.e. departures from log-normality of size distribu-
tions and fatter tailed, tent-shaped, growth rate distributions) suggest that the underlying
growth-size dynamics is not well described by a simple Gibrat-type process with indepen-
dent increments. This conclusion is further reinforced by looking at how growth average
a n ds t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o nv a r yw i t ha v e r a g e( w i t h i nb i n s )ﬁrm sizes23. As already found in
22These results are also conﬁrmed by non-parametric kernel estimates (performed using a normal kernel
with a 0.2 bandwidth) of size and ] SCF densities. Results are available from the Authors upon request.
23In this and all subsequent plots, we do not depict conﬁdence intervals as they typically lie very close
11regression exercises, small ﬁrms seem to grow more on average, but their growth patterns
appear to be more volatile than those of larger ﬁrms. This holds true for all measures of
size (cf. Fig. 4 for the employees distribution). In fact, one typically observes a rapidly
declining pattern for both average and variance of growth rates as size increases, which
however stabilizes for larger ﬁrm size values24.
But how do liquidity constraints aﬀect the joint size-growth distribution? To explore
this issue, we investigated how average and standard deviation of size (log ^ EMP)a n d
growth (^ EMP_GR) pooled distributions (as well as their correlation) change with respect
to (within-bins) averages of ] SCF25.
Our exercises point out that — in line with regressions results — ﬁrms facing stronger
liquidity constraints are associated with lower average growth and smaller average size (cf.
Fig. 5). We also ﬁnd that smaller cash ﬂows imply more volatile growth patterns, while
no clear implications can be drawn as far as within-bins size variability is concerned (cf.
Fig. 6).
As a consequence, one observes statistically-detectable diﬀerences in both size and
growth distributions associated to strongly vs. weakly liquidity-constrained ﬁrms. As Fig.
7 (left) shows for the 1st and the 10th decile of ] SCF, less liquidity constrained ﬁrms exhibit
size distributions which are substantially shifted to the right. Once one controls for any
mean-variance shift and compares standardized size distributions (i.e. with zero-mean and
unitary variance), any statistically detectable diﬀerence disappears.
Accordingly, growth rate distributions maintain their characteristic tent-shaped pattern
but the estimated Laplace coeﬃcient (i.e. the estimate for a in eq. 7) decreases with cash
ﬂow: see Fig. 7 (right). Notice that a lower Laplace coeﬃcient (i.e. a steeper Laplace ﬁt)
might be interpreted as evidence in favor of fatter-tailed growth distributions, as long as
the variance of the distribution remains constant26. Again, a comparison of standardized
growth distributions (i.e. with zero-mean and unitary variance) associated to high vs. low
to the statistics values.
24A similar result is obtained if one splits the pooled sample of ﬁrms into “small” (e.g. those belonging
to the 1st quartile) vs. “large” ones (e.g. those belonging to the 4th quartile) and separately estimates our
preferred regression model on each sub-sample. Indeed, the LPE seems to hold for large ﬁrms but fails for
small ones. This conclusions is quite robust to alternative ways of splitting the pooled sample into large
vs. small ﬁrms.
25More formally: given the triple distribution (^ EMP_GRt,log ^ EMPt−1, ] SCFt−1), we computed statis-
tics of (^ EMP_GRt,log ^ EMPt−1) for each 5%-percentile of ] SCFt−1. The qualitative implications we
present in this Section are not dramatically altered if one employs non-standardized values. Notice also
that, in line with our analysis in Section 3, we do not consider further lags for our SCF variable. An interest-
ing extension would be to study the moments of the multivariate distribution (^ EMP_GRt, log ^ EMPt−1,
] SCFt−1,..., ] SCFt−d),w h e r ed ≥ 2.
26If b =0and X is distributed as a Laplace(a),t h e nvar(X)=2a2. Thus, smaller estimates for a imply
fatter tailed distributions only if one controls for their variance.
12cash ﬂow levels no longer reveals statistically detectable diﬀerences: estimated Laplace
coeﬃcients (cf. Fig. 8) are nearly constant with respect to cash ﬂow. The same pattern
also emerges when one plots estimated Laplace coeﬃcients against log of size (not shown).
Our data suggest that liquidity constraints do not dramatically aﬀect the fatness of
growth-rates tails. Less liquidity-constrained ﬁrms do not enjoy high-probability (absolute
values of) large growth shocks, as compared to more liquidity-constrained ones, after one
controls for existing mean-variance trends.
Finally, growth-size correlation27 is always negative for all cash ﬂow levels: cf. Fig. 9.
Nevertheless, the stronger liquidity constraints, the stronger the eﬀe c to fs i z eo ng r o w t h .
Note also that within-bins correlation magnitudes are always signiﬁcantly larger than the
non-conditioned one (i.e. correlation computed across all SCF values).
5 Liquidity Constraints and the Evolution of Size-
Growth Distributions over Time
In the last Section, we characterized some statistical properties of pooled growth and size
distributions conditioning on cash ﬂow. We employed pooled data since we observed that,
once one controls for year-averages, size and growth distributions are almost stationary
over time. Yet, size and growth distributions do exhibit some trends in their moments, as
Table 1 shows. In this Section, we start exploring in more detail the nature of the observed
shifts in non-standardized growth, size, and SCF distributions. Next, in Section 6, we shall
investigate the eﬀect of age on growth-size dynamics. We shall compare, in particular, the
performance of ﬁrms who were more liquidity-constrained and younger at the beginning of
our sample period with that of ﬁrms who held larger SCF and were older.
Let us begin with unconditional size, growth, and scaled cash ﬂow (non-standardized)
distributions. Kernel estimates and statistical tests all conﬁrm that no dramatic shifts
over time are present in our data. All size year distributions (i.e. EMPt, SALt,a n dVA t,
t =1 9 9 5 ,. . . ,2000) exhibit some shift to the right due to an increasing mean (due e.g.
to overall economic growth) and become slightly more concentrated and less skewed to
the right (see Fig. 10). Cash ﬂow ratios seem to be even more stationary (cf. bottom-
right panel). Any observed shift seem however to be entirely due to changes in mean and
variance over the years and disappear when one standardizes the variables.
Similar ﬁndings are obtained for growth rate distributions. Moments of EMP_GRt,
SAL_GRt,a n dVA _GRt (t = 1996, ..., 2000) are almost stable across years (if any,
27Growth-size correlations computed here are not partial ones. Hence, they cannot be compared to
regression results which include other explanatory variables.
13average growth is U-shaped and growth rate standard deviations seem to decline over
time). Tent-shaped distributions emerge in all years and estimated Laplace coeﬃcients are
nearly stable. The unique exception concerns employee growth rate distributions, which
exhibit tails becoming fatter with time. However, when one controls for mean and variance,
estimated Laplace coeﬃcients for EMP_GRt become almost stationary over time, cf. Fig.
11.
Consider now the evolution over time of size-growth distributions conditional on one-
year lagged cash ﬂow ratios, e.g. (EMP_GRt,E M P t−1|SCFt−1)28. We are interested in
asking whether the evidence about the relationship between liquidity constraints and mo-
ments of size-growth distributions (e.g. average and standard deviation) that we obtained
using pooled data (see Section 4) is robust to time-disaggregation.
Our results provide a mixed answer to this question. On the one hand, average size
tends to increase in all years with cash ﬂow (Fig. 12, top-left, for the evidence about 1996
and 2000). On the other hand, average growth rates appear to be increasing with SCF
only in 1996: as one approaches the end of our sample period, average growth rates seem
to be constant with respect to liquidity constraints (Fig. 12, bottom-left). Nevertheless,
growth rates appear to be more volatile the smaller SCF (Fig. 12, bottom-right) in every
year taken in consideration. No clear indication however emerges as to whether strongly
liquidity-constrained ﬁrms enjoy less volatile size distributions (Fig. 12, top-right).
Thus, the negative impact of liquidity constraints on ﬁrm growth, which was quite
strong in our pooled sample, becomes more ambiguous when one disaggregates across
years. We argue that an explanation for this result can be rooted in the way ﬁrms perceive
liquidity constraints over the business cycle. If we do not wash away growth trends in
the whole manufacturing sector, our data may still embed the eﬀects of ﬁrms expectations
about the impact of sheer size and liquidity on their future investments and growth. Since
these expectations typically depend on the business cycle, one might well observe in our
data diﬀerent correlation patterns between ﬁnancial constraints and growth across years.
Yet, notice that many other properties which we have found in our pooled sample ro-
bustly hold also for non-standardized data across time. For example, both size and growth
distributions (conditional on SCF) are quite stable over time. As Fig. 13 shows, size
distributions for highly and weakly liquidity-constrained ﬁrms only shift to the right as we
move from 1995 to 2000, while estimated Laplace coeﬃcients for growth rate distributions
do not exhibit any detectable time-diﬀerence when we compare high and low cash ﬂow
ﬁrms (cf. Fig. 14) after having controlled for their variance. In addition, the correlation
between EMP_GRt and EMPt−1 remains always negative for each t and each cash ﬂow
28We employ SCFt−1 only because the correlation with size and growth variables typically become
almost irrelevant for SCFt−k,k>1.
14bin. The magnitude of the size-growth correlation turns out to be larger the stronger liq-
uidity constraints are and appears to have substantially decreased in the sample period
(see Fig. 15).
6 Size, Age, Liquidity Constraints, and Firm Growth
The evidence discussed at the end of the last Section indicates that our panel of ﬁrms has
somewhat shifted over time towards a Gibrat-like growth-size dynamics. The decrease of
growth-size correlation across years is probably due to the overall growth experienced by the
whole manufacturing sector in the sampled period (on average, all ﬁrms grew by 4.3287%
from 1995 to 2000). On the one hand, evidence on pooled data suggests that small, younger,
and weakly liquidity-constrained ﬁrms should have beneﬁted from higher growth. On the
other hand, smaller ﬁrms are typically younger but more liquidity-constrained than larger
ones. In addition, we observed that the negative correlation between liquidity-constraints
and growth may be weakened by time-disaggregation.
Thus, an interesting issue concerns whether across-years performances of ﬁrms who were
young but strongly liquidity-constrained at the beginning of the period could be larger than
that experienced by ﬁrms who were older but held large cash ﬂows. More generally, we
are interested here in assessing whether ﬁrm age might allow us to better understand how
liquidity constraints aﬀect size-growth patterns. In order to answer these questions, we
start by analyzing how age aﬀects cash ﬂow ratios, size, and growth distributions over
time.
To begin with, ﬁrm age in our dataset is log-normally distributed, as conﬁrmed by both
density estimates - see Fig.16 - and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Controlling for age only, we
ﬁnd that younger ﬁrms grow more, are smaller and more liquidity-constrained as expected
(Fazzari and Athey, 1987; Cabral and Mata, 2003). Furthermore, cash ﬂow ratios, size,
and growth rates are more variable among younger ﬁrms than among older ones29.
Suppose now to simultaneously control for age and liquidity constraints. More speciﬁ-
cally, let us deﬁne “young” (resp. “old”) those ﬁrms who belong to the ﬁrst (resp. tenth)
decile of the logAGE distribution in 199530. Accordingly, let us call “strongly liquidity-
constrained” (SLC) and, respectively, “weakly liquidity-constrained” (WLC) ﬁrms who be-
long to the ﬁrst and, respectively, tenth decile of the SCF distribution in 1995. Consider
now the sub-sample of “young” and SLC ﬁrms (YSLC) - and, accordingly, the sub-sample
29More precisely, binned average (resp. standard deviation) of log of employees and log of scaled cash
ﬂow are increasing (resp. decreasing) with respect to (within-bins) averages of log of age. Conversely,
binned growth-rates average and standard deviation are both decreasing with (within-bins) averages of log
of age.
30Incidentally, “young” ﬁrms have less than 12 years, while “old” ones have more than 42 years.
15of “old” and WLC ﬁrms (OWLC) - and let us study size and growth distributions of YSLC
and OWLC ﬁrms over time.
As Fig. 17 shows, YSLC ﬁrms grew persistently more not only than OWLC ones, but
also than ﬁrms who were just “young” in 1995. Furthermore, YSLC ﬁrms who were “small”
in 1995 (i.e. who belonged, in addition, to the ﬁrst decile of the 1995 employees distribution)
experienced from 1996 to 2000 better-than-average growth rates and outperformed YSLC
ﬁrms who were “large” in 1995 (i.e. who also belonged to the tenth decile of the 1995
employees distribution). This means that, by focusing on young, cash-constrained (and
possibly small) ﬁrms, we are eliciting a sub-sample of dynamic ﬁrms who, despite (or
even thanks to) low levels of cash ﬂow ratios, are able to enjoy high growth rates in the
subsequent periods31.
These pieces of evidence indicate that some weak catching-up process has been occurring
during 1995-2000: see Fig. 18. Indeed, YSLC ﬁrm size distributions shift to the right, while
OWLC ones are almost unchanged.
Shifts in size distributions from 1995 to 2000 are however better detectable if one
controls for age only (as the number of observations increases). Fig. 19 shows that the
distribution of “old” ﬁrms in 1995 was to the right of “young” ones (and slightly more
concentrated). Between 1995 and 2000, “young” ﬁrms grew more than “old” ones: size
distributions in 2000 are closer than in 1995 (Figs. 20 and 21). To the contrary, “old”
ﬁrms enjoyed very weak growth, as their 1995 and 2000 size distributions almost coincide
(cf. Fig. 22). Similar results can be obtained by exploring how cash ﬂow distributions
change over time for “young” and “old” ﬁrms.
Finally, log of size distributions all depart from normality but we do not ﬁnd any
statistically detectable change in their shape. Contrary to Cabral and Mata (2003), who
report (for Portuguese ﬁrms) evidence about shifts towards less skewed size distributions
over time, Italian ones (conditional on age and/or cash ﬂow) are always well approximated
by highly skewed densities across the entire period of observation.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have analyzed the relationships between liquidity constraints and ﬁrm
growth dynamics for Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. Our main goal was to assess whether any
detectable departure from the “Law of Proportionate Eﬀects” might be better explained
by taking into account the link between ﬁnancial factors and growth.
31Since we are only observing surviving ﬁrms, further analyses are required to take care of any selection
eﬀects present in our data.
16Gibrat-type regression exercises on pooled data show that liquidity constraints (as prox-
ied by cash ﬂow scaled by ﬁrm sales) engender a negative, statistically signiﬁcant, eﬀect
on growth once one controls for sheer size. Moreover, smaller ﬁrms grow more, even when
one controls for liquidity constraints.
This evidence against the LPE is further reinforced by a statistical analysis of pooled
distributions. We ﬁnd that size distributions depart from log-normality, while growth rates
are well approximated by fat-tailed, tent-shaped (Laplace) densities. Moreover, ﬁrms facing
stronger liquidity constraints grow less and experience more volatile growth patterns. The
negative impact of size on growth seems to increase in magnitude as liquidity constraints
become more severe. Growth rate distributions seem however to be quite robust to cash
ﬂow ratios, once one controls for mean-variance shifts.
We also studied the evolution of size, growth, and scaled cash ﬂow distributions over
time. Our exercises suggest that the magnitude of the size-growth correlation has substan-
tially decreased through time for any level of cash ﬂow. Moreover, the negative impact
of liquidity constraints on ﬁrm growth — which we found to be quite strong in our pooled
sample — becomes more ambiguous when one disaggregates across years.
We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms who were young and strongly liquidity-constrained at the begin-
ning of the sample period grew persistently more than those who were just young, and than
those who were old and weakly liquidity-constrained. Those ﬁrms turn out to be typically
small and quite dynamic entities, which are capable of experiencing high performances
despite they were highly cash-constrained at the beginning of the sample period.
Shifts to the right in size distributions for young and strongly liquidity-constrained
ﬁrms can also be detected. However, in contrast to existing literature (Cabral and Mata,
2003), size distributions remain quite skewed in the entire period.
Many interesting issues remain to be explored.
First, alternative proxies of liquidity-constraints could be considered in order to test
the robustness of our results. For example, one might attempt to study what happens
by building liquidity-constraints proxies based on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial stock variables, such as
leverage measures (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002). As an exploratory study, we performed
regression exercises where we replaced cash-ﬂow ratios with “gearing ratios” (G), measured
by the ratio between ﬁrm’s total long term debt and short term debt towards bank and net
total assets. We ﬁnd that the “gearing ratio” is signiﬁcant and negative, probably because
it accounts for a sort of “risk eﬀect”. However, if we also add to the regression our original
scaled cash-ﬂow measure, as well as a multiplicative regressor SCF ∗ G, the latter term
turns out to be signiﬁcant and positive. This means that, given two ﬁrms with similar
cash ﬂow ratios, the one with higher gearing ratio grows more. Our data seems to support
the idea that ﬁrms with higher access to external ﬁnance grow more. Moreover, a double
17signalling eﬀect seems to be at work: ﬁrms with higher cash-ﬂow ratios seem to be those
with higher access to external capital.
Second, a more thorough disaggregated sectoral analysis is needed in order to ascertain
the extent to which liquidity constraints aﬀect in idiosyncratic ways the patterns of growth
of diﬀerent industries (Bottazzi, Ceﬁs, and Dosi, 2002). For example, an interesting exercise
might involve mapping technological speciﬁcities into diﬀerent properties of growth-size-
SCF dynamics.
Finally, one could try to jointly estimate investment and growth equations (and include
as independent variables size, age, and proxies for liquidity constraints) in order to better
understand the causal relations going from ﬁnancial factors to growth and back. Along
these lines, building upon recent contributions by Klette and Griliches (2000), Hall (2002),
and Bougheas, Holger, and Strobl (2003), one might study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints
on R&D investment and growth.
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21V ariable Y ear Mean StDev V arCoeff Median Kurtosis Skewness
1995 96.01 1026.27 10.69 35.00 6897.89 77.36
1996 98.60 705.22 7.15 38.00 6459.91 70.60
EMP 1997 100.95 683.15 6.77 40.00 5707.06 65.36
1998 101.30 650.69 6.42 40.00 5280.79 62.37
1999 100.14 572.44 5.72 40.00 4439.05 55.80
2000 101.58 400.63 3.94 41.00 806.09 23.67
1995 20145.52 194548.99 9.66 6669.00 8153.74 81.48
1996 20224.12 160180.08 7.92 6800.00 6155.25 67.89
SAL 1997 22420.34 196892.42 8.78 7123.00 5611.88 64.68
1998 22856.39 186945.17 8.18 7477.00 5721.81 65.10
1999 23719.82 193310.99 8.15 7516.00 5579.45 63.93
2000 25707.81 155260.23 6.04 8245.00 1107.74 28.96
1995 5055.55 45556.89 9.01 1676.00 7162.51 75.72
1996 4978.80 28630.23 5.75 1739.00 2393.64 40.68
VA 1997 5479.97 40985.14 7.48 1776.00 3592.83 52.64
1998 5527.24 33573.26 6.07 1840.00 1887.94 37.58
1999 5658.97 32799.82 5.80 1895.00 2031.77 38.27
2000 6011.42 36595.92 6.09 1987.00 3682.48 49.43
1995 1397.81 17971.56 12.86 323.00 5076.67 63.38
1996 1222.26 12462.08 10.20 317.00 4182.24 52.82
CF 1997 1473.15 30412.31 20.64 316.00 8549.94 82.34
1998 1445.30 20350.60 14.08 324.00 9696.49 89.39
1999 1600.97 26633.23 16.64 348.00 10924.46 98.24
2000 2140.89 45365.32 21.19 353.00 7524.51 81.42
1995 0.07 0.33 4.57 0.05 10603.81 96.88
1996 0.07 0.42 6.19 0.05 12628.96 109.56
CF/SAL 1997 0.06 0.13 2.05 0.05 5490.84 62.15
1998 0.06 0.08 1.33 0.05 3606.24 18.02
1999 0.07 0.08 1.21 0.05 4494.65 14.82
2000 0.05 0.43 9.09 0.04 2844.92 17.77
1996 0.12 0.30 0.41 0.09 84.90 3.15
1997 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.02 70.32 1.20
EMP_GR 1998 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.00 56.54 −3.39
1999 −0.06 0.48 −0.12 0.00 19.87 −1.95
2000 0.04 0.68 0.05 0.04 13.89 −1.07
1996 0.03 0.32 0.11 0.02 82.76 3.59
1997 0.04 0.26 0.17 0.04 122.06 4.08
SAL_GR 1998 0.04 0.23 0.18 0.04 44.81 0.43
1999 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.01 47.59 0.23
2000 0.07 0.32 0.22 0.09 68.86 −4.22
1996 0.05 0.35 7.32 0.04 38.08 1.63
1997 0.03 0.30 9.11 0.03 63.11 1.26
VA _GR 1998 0.03 0.29 9.08 0.04 32.14 -0.67
1999 0.03 0.31 11.64 0.03 36.93 0.02
2000 0.03 0.39 13.25 0.05 41.41 -2.76
AGE 1995 27.93 83.83 0.33 21.00 533.58 22.81
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Non-Standardized Data. EMP = Employees. SAL =
Sales. VA = Value-Added. CF = Cash Flow. GR = Growth Rate. N = 14277 Firms
observed.
222000 SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP 0.7716 0.7270 0.4071 0.0152
SAL ∗ 0.7104 0.4905 0.0140
VA ∗∗ 0.8171 0.0314
CF ∗∗∗ 0.0444
1999 SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP 0.8921 0.8418 0.2626 0.0333
SAL ∗ 0.7689 0.2716 0.0171
VA ∗∗ 0.6983 0.1025
CF ∗∗∗ 0.1488
1998 SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP 0.9135 0.8503 0.2603 0.0328
SAL ∗ 0.8489 0.3968 0.0126
VA ∗∗ 0.6691 0.0490
CF ∗∗∗ 0.1457
1997 SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP 0.8957 0.8848 0.3426 0.0211
SAL ∗ 0.9121 0.5444 0.0126
VA ∗∗ 0.7065 0.0381
CF ∗∗∗ 0.0689
1996 SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP 0.9234 0.9316 0.3990 0.0153
SAL ∗ 0.8892 0.4541 0.0004
VA ∗∗ 0.4557 −0.0120
CF ∗∗∗ 0.7136
1995 SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP 0.8273 0.8455 0.7443 0.0122
SAL ∗ 0.9544 0.8524 0.0013
VA ∗∗ 0.8813 −0.0066
CF ∗∗∗ 0.3591
Table 2: Correlation Structure. Contemporaneous Distributions of Size Measures and Cash
Flow.
232000-1999 EMP SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP * 0.7340 0.8351 0.2934 0.0541
SAL 0.7670 * 0.7825 0.3645 0.0360
VA 0.6321 0.5748 * 0.8232 0.1238
CF 0.4778 0.4999 0.7727 * 0.1126
CF/SAL 0.0126 0.0109 0.0290 0.0293 *
1999-1998 EMP SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP * 0.9092 0.8598 0.2747 0.0362
SAL 0.8951 * 0.7669 0.2631 0.0638
VA 0.8304 0.8273 * 0.6897 0.0729
CF 0.2574 0.3767 0.6550 * 0.0798
CF/SAL 0.0313 0.0298 0.0950 0.1350 *
1998-1997 EMP SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP * 0.8939 0.8889 0.3463 0.0214
SAL 0.9120 * 0.9050 0.4993 0.0133
VA 0.8358 0.8373 * 0.6364 0.0437
CF 0.2476 0.4225 0.6441 * 0.0609
CF/SAL 0.0344 0.0217 0.0544 0.0689 *
1997-1996 EMP SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP * 0.9190 0.9372 0.4610 0.0786
SAL 0.8799 * 0.8315 0.6252 0.2490
VA 0.8453 0.8230 * 0.7791 0.4807
CF 0.2855 0.3202 0.2238 * 0.8524
CF/SAL 0.0186 0.0070 0.0330 0.0597 *
1996-1995 EMP SAL VA CF CF/SAL
EMP * 0.9057 0.9506 0.8183 0.0160
SAL 0.8062 * 0.9413 0.8267 0.0032
VA 0.7335 0.8281 * 0.7433 -0.0072
CF 0.3442 0.4511 0.4746 * 0.6858
CF/SAL 0.0113 0.0012 -0.0096 0.3661 *
Table 3: One-Year Lagged Correlations
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
EMP_GR 71380 0.0394 0.2221 0.8963 26.3321
Log(EMP) 71382 0.0346 1.2921 −0.7437 2.7124
SAL_GR 71385 0.0387 0.3270 0.7696 65.8774
Log(SAL) 71385 −0.9723 1.0460 1.0193 5.5047
VA _GR 70767 0.0461 0.3192 0.1655 45.6623
Log(VA ) 71091 −0.9778 1.1791 0.7668 5.8549
Log(CF) 71385 −1.1187 1.6984 0.7474 4.8691
CF/SAL 71215 0.8956 3.4897 154.0042 28210.68
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Year-Standardized Pooled Variables
Corr EMP_GR Log(EMP) SAL_GR Log(SAL) VA _GR Log(VA ) Log(CF)
Log(EMP) −0.1150 1.0000 ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
SAL_GR 0.2674 −0.0182 1.0000 ∗∗ ∗ ∗
Log(SAL)0 .0029 0.7604 −0.0942 1.0000 ∗∗∗
VA _GR 0.2498 −0.0349 0.5409 −0.0575 1.0000 ∗∗
Log(VA ) −0.0077 0.9016 −0.0465 0.8647 −0.1293 1.0000 ∗
Log(CF)0 .0263 0.6778 −0.0295 0.7543 −0.0481 0.8240 1.0000
CF/SAL 0.0276 0.1143 0.1247 0.0197 0.0430 0.1837 0.4111
Table 5: Correlation Matrix for Year-Standardized Pooled Variables
24Regressors 1st step 2nd step
Dropped LR test R2 LR test R2
log(EMPi,t−1) 750.84** 0.0095 830.73** 0.0070
(0.0000) (0.0000)
CFi,t−1/SALi,t−1 9.21** 0.0226 9.52** 0.0214
(0.0024) ( 0.0020)
log(AGEi) 2.19 0.0225 Dropped in 1st step
(0.1388)
log2(EMPi,t−1) 533.76** 0.0132 573.90** 0.0115
(0.0000) (0.0000)
log2(AGEi) 0.32 0.0226 Dropped in 1st step
( 0.5689)
CFi,t−2/SALi,t−2 8.62** 0.0224 9.26** 0.0214
(0.0033) ( 0.0023)
Dsubs Yes** Yes**
Dind Yes** Yes**
Dtime Yes** Yes**
Table 6: Model Selection. Results of the Likelihood Ratio Test Procedure. Each row
reports the results of the LR test for the null hypothesis: “Drop from the saturated model
(i.e. the model containing all regressors not previously dropped) the regressor indicated in
the ﬁrst column”. A double (single) asterisk associated to the LR test value indicates that
the regressor must NOT be dropped at 5% (10%).
25Regressors Dependent Variable: EMP_GR
log(EMPi,t−1) -0.0302** -0.0306** -0.0278** -0.1413** -0.1361** -0.1349** -0.1175**
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0043)
CFi,t−1/SALi,t−1 - 0.0358** 0.0348** 0.0336** 0.0329** 0.0327** 0.0186**
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0020) (0.0040) (0.0061)
log(AGEi) - - -0.0242** - -0.0190** -0.0722** -0.0276
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0164) (0.0186)
log2(EMPi,t−1) --- 0.0141** 0.0137** 0.0136** 0.0120**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
log2(AGEi) --- - - 0.0086** 0.0017
(0.0026) (0.0030)
CFi,t−2/SALi,t−2 --- - - - 0.0146**
(0.0050)
Dsubs Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes*
Dind Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes*
Dtime Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes*
Obs 71380 71380 71380 71380 71380 71380 57105
R2 0.0183 0.0195 0.0214 0.0335 0.0346 0.0347 0.0226
F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 7: Model Selection. Results of the R2 Procedure. Standard Errors in parentheses.
In boldface our preferred model. A double (single) asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
(10%).
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Figure 1: Moments of log(EMPi,t/EMPi,t) distribution against time.
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Figure 2: Pooled (Year-Standardized) Employees (Left) and CF/Sales (Right) Distribu-
tions. Log Rank vs. Log Size Plots.
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Figure 3: Pooled (Year-Standardized)
Firm Growth Rates. Binned Empirical
Densities vs. Laplace Fit.
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Figure 4: Mean and Standard Deviation
of Pooled (Year-Std) Employees Growth
Rates as a Function of (Within-Bins) Av-
erage log(Size). Bins computed as 5-
percentiles.
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Figure 5: Mean of Pooled (Year-Std) Size (Left) and Growth Rates (Right) Distributions
as a Function of (Within-Bins) Average CF/Sales. Bins computed as 5-percentiles.
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Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Pooled (Year-Std) Size (Left) and Growth Rates (Right)
Distributions as a Function of (Within-Bins) Average CF/Sales. Bins computed as 5-
percentiles.
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Figure 7: Pooled Log of Employees (Left) and Employees Growth Rate (Right) distribu-
tions conditional to CF/Sales. Strong Liquidity Constraints (LC) means CF/Sales in the
1st Decile. Weak Liquidity Constraints (LC) means CF/Sales in the 10th Decile.
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Figure 8: Estimated Laplace Coeﬃ-
cients for Laplace Fit of Employees
Growth Rates (Zero-Mean, Unitary Vari-
ance) Conditional on (Within-Bins) Aver-
ages of CF/Sales. Bins computed as 5-
percentiles.
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Figure 9: Correlation between
Log(Employees) and Employees Growth
Rates Conditional on (Within-Bins)
Averages of CF/Sales. Bins computed as
5-percentiles.
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Figure 10: Non Parametric Kernel Density Estimates of Non-Standardized Size and
CF/Sales Distributions. Top-Left: Employees. Top-Right: Sales. Bottom-Left: Value
Added. Bottom-Right: CF/Sales (Log Scale). Kernel Density Estimates are performed
employing a Normal Kernel and a 0.2 Bandwidth.
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Figure 11: Shifts of Growth-Rates Distributions over Time. Left: Empirical Distributions
and Laplace Fit for 1996 and 2000 Standardized Employees GR Distributions (Zero Mean,
Unitary Variance). Right: Estimated Laplace Coeﬃcient for 1996 and 2000 Standardized
Employees, Sales, and Value-Added GR Distributions (Zero Mean, Unitary Variance).
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Figure 12: Average and Standard Deviation of Employee Size and Growth Year Distri-
butions conditioned on (Within-Bins) Averages of (1-year Lagged) CF/Sales. Top-Left:
Average of Log of Employees. Top-Right: St.Dev. of Log of Employees. Bottom-Left:
Average of Employees GR. Bottom-Right: St.Dev. of Employees GR. Bins computed as
5-percentiles.
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Figure 13: Non Parametric Kernel Den-
sity Estimation of Log of Employees Year
Distributions conditional on CF/Sales.
Strong Liquidity Constraints (LC) means
CF/Sales in the 1st Decile. Weak Liquid-
ity Constraints (LC) means CF/Sales in
the 10th Decile. Kernel Density Estimates
are performed employing a Normal Kernel
and a 0.2 Bandwidth.
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Figure 14: Estimated Laplace Coef-
ﬁcients for Laplace Fit of Employees
Growth Rates Distributions conditional
on CF/Sales.
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Figure 15: Correlation between Employees Growth Rate at time t and Size Distributions
at time t − 1, conditional on CF/Sales at time t − 1. Bins computed as 10-percentiles.
340.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Log(Age)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
Density
Normal
Figure 16: Non Parametric Kernel Density Estimation of Log of Age Distribution. Normal
ﬁt shown as dotted line. Kernel Density Estimates is performed employing a Normal Kernel
and a 0.2 Bandwidth.
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Figure 17: Average of Growth Rates Distributions Conditioned on Age, CF/Sales, and Size
in 1995. YSLC: Young Firms with Small CF/Sales (1st Decile). OWLC: Old Firms with
Large CF/Sales (10th Decile). Small (Large) Firms: Firms within the 1st (10th) Decile of
1995 Employees Distribution.
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Figure 18: Non Parametric Kernel Density Estimation of Log of Employees Distributions
over Time. Left: YSLC Firms. Right: OWLC Firms. YSLC: Young Firms (1st Decile)
with Small CF/Sales (1st Decile). OWLC: Old Firms (10th Decile) with Large CF/Sales
(10th Decile). Normal Kernel. Bandwith=0.2
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Figure 19: Non Parametric Kernel Den-
sity Estimation of Log of Employees Dis-
tribution. Young Firms vs. Old Firms
in 1995. Young Firms: Firms in the 1st
Decile. Old Firms: Firms in the 10th
Decile. Normal Kernel. Bandwith=0.2
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Figure 20: Non Parametric Kernel Den-
sity Estimation of Log of Employees Dis-
tribution. Young Firms vs. Old Firms
in 2000. Young Firms: Firms in the 1st
Decile. Old Firms: Firms in the 10th
Decile. Normal Kernel. Bandwith=0.2
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Figure 21: Non Parametric Kernel Den-
sity Estimation of Log of Employees Dis-
tribution. Young Firms in 1995 and 2000.
Young Firms: Firms in the 1st Decile. Old
Firms: Firms in the 10th Decile. Normal
Kernel. Bandwith=0.2
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Figure 22: Non Parametric Kernel Den-
sity Estimation of Log of Employees Dis-
tribution. Old Firms in 1995 and 2000.
Young Firms: Firms in the 1st Decile. Old
Firms: Firms in the 10th Decile. Normal
Kernel. Bandwith=0.2
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